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INTRODUCTION
Daniel Kahneman's' recent book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, is a must-
read for any scholar or policymaker interested in behavioral economics.
Behavioral economics is a young, but already well-established, discipline
that pervasively affects law and legal theory.2 Kahneman, a 2002 Nobel
Laureate, is the discipline's founding father. His pioneering work with
Amos Tversky and others challenges the core economic concept of ex-
pected utility, which serves to determine the value of people's prospects.'
Under mainstream economic theory, the value of a person's prospect equals
the prospect's utility upon materialization (U) multiplied by the probability
of the prospect materializing (P).4 When the prospect is advantageous, its
utility is a positive sum that augments the person's well-being. When the
prospect is disadvantageous, its utility is a negative sum (a disutility) that
decreases the person's well-being. Under both scenarios, the full amount of
the person's utility or disutility is discounted by the prospect's probability of
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1. Daniel Kahneman is a Senior Scholar and a Professor of Psychology and Public
Affairs, Emeritus, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton
University, and the Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology, Emeritus, Princeton University.
2. See Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Econom-
ics?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1653, 1653-56 (describing the pervasive effect of behavioral
economics on legal theory and claiming that "the battle to separate the economic analysis of
legal rules and institutions from the straightjacket of strict rational choice assumptions has
been won" (footnote omitted)); Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust,
86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1528-31 (2011) (underscoring the mainstream status of behavioral eco-
nomics and criticizing neoclassical economists' refusal to incorporate behavioral inputs in
their analyses of antitrust problems).
3. For an excellent summary of this work, see Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded
Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003).
4. For a foundational account of expected utility, see JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR
MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 15-29 (2d ed. 1947).
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not materializing. Economic theory holds that the expected-utility formula,
P • U, ought to determine a rational person's choice among available courses
of action. The action yielding the highest expected utility is the one that the
person ought rationally to prefer over the alternatives.
This normative assumption underlies all economic models that predict
human behavior. For example, when a legal system apprehends 10 percent
(0.1) of all drivers who run a red light and forces each violator to pay a $300
fine, the expected fine for each prospective violator equals $30. Economic
theory consequently predicts that a risk-neutral driver will run a red light
when her expected gain from doing so exceeds $30. Hence, when the aver-
age social loss from a red-light violation (including the marginal increase in
society's cost of enforcing the law) exceeds $30, economically minded
scholars and policymakers recommend upping the fine to a sum that will
eradicate the drivers' antisocial incentive to violate.5
Kahneman and his collaborators have carried out numerous experiments
that examined people's determinations of probability and utility. These ex-
periments purport to identify a systematic mismatch between the P. U
formula and the ways in which people typically make decisions in the real
world. Specifically, the experiments have been interpreted as demonstrating
that people systematically err in calculating probability and appraising utili-
ty. According to Kahneman and other behavioral economists, these errors
manifest people's bounded rationality. 6
As far as probability is concerned, people often seem to allow familiar
and stereotypical scenarios to override statistical information (pp. 112-13,
119-23, Chapter Twelve). They ignore general statistical information-
specifically, they ignore "base rates" (pp. 146-69)-which causes them to
underestimate the probability of unfamiliar events (pp. 149-53) and overes-
timate the probability of scenarios that fall within their experience or easily
come to mind, such as natural disasters or startling events that have occurred
recently (Chapter Thirteen). In the domain of utility, people fare no better.
They irrationally allow their choices to be influenced by the framing of future
prospects as either "gains" or "losses" (Chapter Twenty-Six). Specifically, the
average person strongly prefers the prospect of not losing a certain amount of
money to an equally probable prospect of gaining the same amount of mon-
ey.7 This preference explains people's loss aversion8 and their unwillingness to
sell property that they already own at what should be an economically attrac-
tive price (the "endowment effect").9 Additionally, people's actions are often
5. See Alex Stein, The Flawed Probabilistic Foundation of Law and Economics, 105
Nw. U. L. REV. 199, 200-01 (2011).
6. Pp. 412-14. The "bounded rationality" concept originates from HERBERT A. SIMON,
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (4th ed. 1997). See, e.g., Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality, 2
ANN. REV. POL. SCl. 297, 302 (1999).
7. Pp. 278-83. See generally A. Peter McGraw et al., Comparing Gains and Losses,
21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1438 (2010).
8. Pp. 283-86; see also McGraw et al., supra note 7, at 1443.
9. Chapter 27. See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the En-
dowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (showing that the
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driven by sunk costs-expenses that have already been incurred, and that an
economically rational individual ought to ignore. 0
These findings regarding bounded rationality have a far-reaching impli-
cation: they prompt policymakers and scholars to abandon the neoclassical
homo economicus assumption used to predict people's choices and evaluate
the effects of policy interventions. I Kahneman argues that scholars and pol-
icymakers would do well to shift their attention to the ways in which typical
real-world people appraise probability and utility. These ways, according to
Kahneman, exhibit misjudgments that are potentially harmful to the person
making a decision and anyone else who depends on her decision.
These findings have won many adherents among legal scholars.12 Their
broad acceptance in the legal academy has led to the establishment of the
discipline of Behavioral Law and Economics. 3 Scholars working in this
discipline use these findings as a basis for recommending a variety of legal
reforms: the mandatory supply of information to error-prone individuals, 4
"soft" choice architecture, 5 and regulatory intervention to prevent and cor-
rect people's mistakes.' 6 Areas that these reform proposals try to influence
include accidents and risk regulation, consumer agreements, business con-
tracts, credit and lending, employment, insurance, prenuptial agreements,
endowment effect frustrates efficient bargaining even when transaction costs are zero, as par-
ties overvalue their entitlements, which makes the initial allocation of legal entitlements
consequential, contrary to the Coase Theorem).
10. Pp. 342-46. See generally Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of
Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 126-36 (1985).
11. See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008) (unfolding a robust
and radical account of people's irrational choices); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (describing
people's irrationalities in probability and utility assessments and offering ways to fix them).
12. See Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1653-54 (attesting that behavioral economics has
been broadly accepted in legal scholarship). See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
(Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ed., 2009) (comprehensive area-based anthology); BEHAVIORAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (early area-based collection of articles).
13. For the seminal work that inaugurated the discipline and that became the most-cited
law journal article since 1995, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Be-
havioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). See also Korobkin,
supra note 2, at 1654-55 (attesting that Jolls et al., supra, garnered the largest number of law
journal citations since 1995).
14. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 49 (2009) (using behavioral economics to propose expansive disclosure requirements in
connection with cellular service agreements). But see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider,
The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (criticizing the ongoing
expansion of disclosure requirements).
15. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 81-100 (introducing the "choice archi-
tecture" method, understood as governmental manipulation of individuals' menu of choices in
a manner that nudges those individuals to take the desired action).
16. For summary of regulatory initiatives driven by behavioral economics and an ana-
lytical framework for regulation premised on subjects' bounded rationality, see Michael P.
Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 763-78 (2011).
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and adjudicative factfinding.' 7 Kahneman's book outlines and approves of
some of these proposed reforms (pp. 412-15).
Two features-theory and accessibility-make Thinking, Fast and Slow
an indispensable book. Behavioral economics has existed for nearly four
decades and is unlikely to fade away. Yet, prior to the publication of Think-
ing, behavioral economics had developed no integrated theory of bounded
rationality's causes and characteristics. 8 Instead of developing such a theo-
ry, behavioral economists engaged in largely experimental work that
uncovered discrete manifestations of people's bounded rationality. These
manifestations include "representativeness,"'' 9 "availability,"20 "anchoring,"'"
"overoptimism, '22 "base-rate neglect,"23 "hindsight bias, '24 loss aversion (pp.
283-88), and other misevaluations of probability and utility (pp. 222-29,
363-74). Behavioral economists had developed no causal explanations for
17. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (2008) (identifying and calling for regulatory correction of people's overoptimism in
consumer credit agreements); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits
of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) (identifying overoptimism in people's liquidated
damage undertakings, prenuptial agreements, and other areas of contract and commending a
regime that authorizes courts to modify contractually prearranged payments and waivers); Jolls et
al., supra note 13, at 1522-28 (identifying and calling for regulatory correction of hindsight
biases in courts' determinations of negligence, environmental torts, punitive damages, and non-
obviousness of patented inventions); Dan M. Kahan, The Economics-Conventional, Behavioral,
and Political-Of "Subsequent Remedial Measures" Evidence, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1616,
1623-25 (2010) (describing the effect of hindsight bias on factfinding in adjudication); Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
571 (1998) (identifying presence of hindsight bias in courts' ascertainments of parties' com-
pliance with ex ante norms and commending legal rules that counteract this bias); Cass R.
Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1167-68
(1986) (identifying and calling for regulatory correction of base-rate neglects in people's deci-
sions about risk and insurance, contractual undertakings, and their own employment
termination prospects); Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent
Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 733 (2009) (identifying and calling for regulatory correction of people's base-rate
neglects and resulting overconfidence in marriage-related and employment agreements and in
credit card borrowing); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 269-
70 (1998) (identifying and calling for regulatory correction of people's base-rate neglects and
availability bias in savings and credit decisions).
18. For a similar line of critique, see Drew Fudenberg, Advancing Beyond Advances in
Behavioral Economics, 44 J. EcON. LITERATURE 694, 696 (2006) ("[Ulnless the insights and
stylized facts obtained so far are related to a small number of models of individual behavior,
with some guidelines for when each model should be expected to apply, behavioral economics
may remain a distinct field with its own methodology.").
19. Chapter 14 (reliance on familiar stereotypes instead of base rates).
20. Chapter 12 (alignment of an event's probability to the ease with which it can be
called to mind).
21. Chapter 11 (excessive reliance on the initial value of an event's probability).
22. Chapter 24 (also known as the "planning fallacy").
23. Chapter 16 (failure to account for general probabilities relevant to one's decision).
24. Chapter 19 (retrospective assessment of a probability that needs to be determined
prospectively).
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these misevaluations.25 All they had done was identify, describe, and catego-
rize these misevaluations one by one.
Thinking does not content itself with an untheorized catalog of descrip-
tions; it goes considerably further, and seeks to develop a unified
explanation of causes and effects. Remarkably, it is the first book to provide
a comprehensive and theorized, as well as fully updated, account of bound-
ed rationality. Kahneman's account of bounded rationality combines
experimental and empirical findings with a causal theory. This theory builds
on two reasoning mechanisms that, according to Kahneman and other psy-
chologists, define people's mental makeup.26 One of those mechanisms,
identified as System 1, relies on intuition (pp. 19-30, 89-96, 105). Another
mechanism, identified as System 2, relies on deliberation (pp. 19-30).
A person using System 1 thinks fast. Her thinking invokes instincts and
hunches, of which some are experience based and others are biologically
hardwired (pp. 24-25). These instincts and hunches enable her to form
quick and effortless responses to tasks, questions, and challenges (p. 25). By
and large, she bases her responses on familiar causal associations, while
relying on the "What you see is all there is" assumption (pp. 85-88). This
assumption conveniently establishes the person's informational base as a
mix of her individual observations and experiences (p. 87). This mix is de-
pendable for the most part, but it also results in wrong decisions being made
in a nonnegligible number of cases (pp. 87-88). These wrong decisions re-
sult from an individual's failure to account for information that lies beyond
her cognitive horizon (pp. 87-88). This cognitively remote and consequently
unaccounted-for information includes statistical data that are often crucial
for a person's decision (pp. 109-18).
System 2 relies on deliberation but still fails to protect people against
probabilistic errors, as people use it selectively (pp. 39-49). Paradoxically, it
is System 1 that decides whether a person will use System 2 (p. 44). As a
result, people resort to System 2 only in a state of uncertainty and disbelief
(p. 81)-that is, when they encounter a difficult task that calls for a disci-
plined analytical solution (e.g., finding the square root of 2,226,064). Since
mental energy is a scarce resource, people use System 2 sparingly and slow-
ly. As a result, System 2 becomes busy, lazy, and depleted (pp. 39-42),
while System 1 dominates people's decisionmaking27 and drives them into
probabilistic misconceptions that substitute heuristics for data (pp. 109-84).
Thinking is beautifully written: its insights are rich, profound, and at the
same time lucid and exceptionally well presented. These virtues make the
25. See Fudenberg, supra note 18, at 696-98 (spotting weaknesses of causally unspeci-
fied accounts of bounded rationality).
26. See Keith E. Stanovich & Richard E West, Individual Differences in Reasoning:
Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCt. 645, 658-60 (2000) (intro-
ducing the concepts of System 1 and System 2).
27. See p. 41. Kahneman mentions that "[p]eople who are cognitively busy are also
more likely to make selfish choices, use sexist language, and make superficial judgments in
social situations." Id. (emphasis omitted). I find this hard to believe. Self-interest and social
norms must calibrate System 1 to filter out socially inappropriate speech.
April 20131
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book accessible not only to a specialized readership, including economists,
decision psychologists, and economically minded legal scholars, but also to
readers possessing a basic familiarity with social science. As a grandmaster
of psychology, Kahneman knows a lot about human intuition. In Thinking,
he utilizes this knowledge to develop intuitive explanations for complex
economic and psychological phenomena. Kahneman accompanies these
explanations with brilliantly selected examples from real life and controlled
experiments-a presentation that immensely benefits the book's reader. For
nonspecialized readers, the book reproduces two famous articles in which
Kahneman and Tversky developed the insights that defined behavioral eco-
nomics as a field.28
The book's virtues, however, do not make it uncontroversial. In what
follows, I examine Kahneman's account of people's probabilistic irrationali-
ty, an account that occupies the majority of the book.29 This examination
reveals my profound disagreement with Kahneman's grim assessment of
ordinary people's reasoning, widely known as the "bounded rationality the-
sis.'30 Specifically, I posit that Kahneman and his collaborators use
inadequate criteria for evaluating people's determinations of probability.
These criteria fail to separate decisions that follow rules ("acceptances")
from decisions that rely on rule-free intuitions ("beliefs"). These criteria
also fail to recognize a distinct and perfectly rational mode of reasoning that
associates an event's probability with the quantum and variety of evidence
confirming the event's occurrence while eliminating rival scenarios (Baco-
nian or causative probability). Moreover, Kahneman's methodology
tolerates the presence of unspecified causality and malleable reference clas-
ses in experimental settings. These flaws are identified and analyzed in Parts
I, II, and III below. I show that these flaws foil Kahneman's experiments,
which mix statistical data with case-specific information. As a result, these
experiments do not reveal anything about the rationality of people's proba-
bilistic decisions. Indeed, I demonstrate that those decisions are entirely
rational.
I. REVISITING BOUNDED RATIONALITY
My critique of Kahneman's bounded rationality thesis rests on two inde-
pendent grounds: methodological and probabilistic. I find Kahneman's
account methodologically deficient because it ignores the division between
28. Pp. 419-48. The reproduced articles are Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974), and Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
29. This account occupies Parts II and III of the book, titled respectively "Heuristics
and Biases" and "Overconfidence." The discussion in Part I ("Two Systems") and Part V
("Two Selves") identifies the causes of people's misevaluations of probability and utility. Only
Part IV ("Choices") focuses exclusively on the formation of people's utility preferences.
30. See Kahneman, supra note 3.
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"belief' and "acceptance" drawn by philosophers of rationality.31 Under this
taxonomy, "acceptance" is a mentally active process that includes applica-
tion of decisional rules to available information.32 "Belief," by contrast, is a
person's feeling, sensation, or hunch: an intellectually passive state of mind
generated by unanalyzed experiences. 33
Importantly, "belief' and "acceptance" are not analogs of System 1
and System 2. The System 1-System 2 taxonomy captures the intensity of
a person's brainwork. To this end, it focuses on whether the person puts
deliberative effort into her decisions (System 2) or decides quickly and
unreflectively by using her intuition (System 1). By contrast, the belief-
acceptance taxonomy captures the brainwork's normative content by
separating the person's rule-free decisions (beliefs) from her rule-driven
decisions (acceptances). System 1 and System 2 can generate both beliefs
and acceptances, depending on whether the person follows decisional rules
intuitively or reflectively. To be sure, a rule follower will use System 2
more often than System 1. Many people, however, also develop rule-driven
instincts: drivers following the "two-second rule" to avoid colliding with a
vehicle ahead of them are a good example of persons making rule-driven
decisions that fall under System 1. On the other hand, some people may
expend their deliberative efforts (System 2) on the formation of rule-free
beliefs.
Behavioral experiments underlying the bounded rationality thesis uni-
formly miss the belief-acceptance distinction. People who participate in
these experiments develop no rule-based acceptances, nor are they asked to
form such acceptances by the experimenters. All they do is report their pre-
analytical beliefs because that is what the experimenters ask them to do.
People's rationality, however, can only be evaluated by reference to their
acceptances that apply rules of reasoning. 34 Identifying the criteria, or rules,
that people apply in their evaluations of probability is therefore of far great-
er consequence than whether they think fast or slow.
David Hume's magnum opus, A Treatise on Human Nature, long ago an-
ticipated the belief-acceptance divide in people's ascriptions of probabilities
to uncertain events. 35 Hume distinguished between "philosophical" probabil-
ity or normative belief-which attaches to "chances"36 and "causes" 3 7-and
31. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, AN ESSAY ON BELIEF AND ACCEPTANCE 1-27, 100-08
(1992) (delineating the differences between "belief' and "acceptance").
32. Id. at 16-20.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 88 ("Nor would [a belief] deserve praise or blame in the way that a responsi-
ble act of acceptance deserves it.").
35. See 1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 97-104 (David Fate Norton &
Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1739) (distinguishing between intuitive ("un-
philosophical") and rule-based ("philosophical") probabilities).
36. Id. at 86-89.
37. Id. at 89-97.
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"unphilosophical" probability or unreflective belief.38 Hume's account of
"unphilosophical" probability presciently identified the psychological phe-
nomena now known as "availability,"3 9 "representativeness,"40 "base-rate
neglect,' 41 and "hindsight bias. '42 Importantly, Hume did not suggest that
people are predestined to use "unphilosophical" probability instead of nor-
mative probability. Rather, he argued that "unphilosophical" probabilities
are hard (albeit not impossible) to control.43
Behavioral economists' disregard of Hume's work is unfortunate. Even
more disappointing is Kahneman's and other behavioral economists' failure
to investigate people's acceptances as distinguished from their beliefs. As I
explain below in Part II, this omission undermines the bounded rationality
thesis in the area of probability. Failure to separate rule-based acceptances
from rule-free beliefs has also led Kahneman and other behavioral econo-
mists to conflate people's cognitive performance with cognitive
38. Id. at97-104.
39. Below is Hume's description of the "availability" heuristic:
An experiment, that is recent and fresh in the memory, affects us more than one that is in
some measure obliterated; and has a superior influence on the judgment, as well as on
the passions. A lively impression produces more assurance than a faint one; because it
has more original force to communicate to the related idea, which thereby acquires a
greater force and vivacity.
Id. at 98.
40. Id. ("A greater force and vivacity in the impression naturally conveys a greater [sic]
to the related idea; and 'tis on the degrees of force and vivacity, that the belief depends, ac-
cording to the foregoing system.").
41. Hume's criticism of base-rate neglect appears in his famous essay on miracles. See
DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE
PRIN IPLES OF MORALS 109-31 (PH. Nidditch ed., 3d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1777).
For superb analysis of Hume's essay, see David Owen, Hume Versus Price on Miracles and
Prior Probabilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation, 37 PHIL. Q. 187, 188-91 (1987)
(explaining Hume's critique of people's natural inclination to believe credible witnesses who
report on improbable events).
42. See I HUME, supra note 35, at 100 ("In almost all kinds of causes there is a compli-
cation of circumstances, of which some are essential, and others superfluous; some are
absolutely requisite to the production of the effect, and others are only conjoined by accident.
Now we may observe, that when these superfluous circumstances are numerous, and remarka-
ble, and frequently conjoined with the essential, they have such an influence on the
imagination, that even in the absence of the latter they carry us on to the conception of the
usual effect, and give to that conception a force and vivacity.").
43. Remarkably, Hume also identified the "endowment effect" in people's valuations of
their possessions:
Such is the effect of custom, that it not only reconciles us to any thing we have long en-
joyed, but even gives us an affection for it, and makes us prefer it to other objects, which
may be more valuable, but are less known to us. What has long lain under our eye, and
has often been employed to our advantage, that we are always the most unwilling to part
with; but can easily live without possessions, which we never have enjoyed, and are not
accustomed to.
Id. at 323.
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competence.' This conflation makes the resulting behavioral accounts defi-
cient. The fact that a person systematically makes statistical errors in
forming her beliefs does not establish that she would also commit those er-
rors in forming her acceptances-a process in which she would familiarize
herself with and reflectively apply the requisite statistical rules. In fact, em-
pirical studies of statistical education report the considerable success of the
various learning methods through which students acquire understandings of
statistical inference. 45
My probabilistic critique of Kahneman's theory unfolds in Part III. This
critique questions the statistical-causative mix of information on which
Kahneman, Tversky, and other behavioral economists base their experi-
ments. To see what I mean by the "statistical-causative mix," consider one
of Kahneman and Tversky's most famous experiments, widely known as the
"Blue Cab Problem."46 Kahneman, Tversky, and their collaborators told
their participants about a hit-and-run accident that occurred at night in a city
in which 85% of cabs were blue and 15% were green. They also told the
participants that the hit-and-run victim filed a lawsuit against the companies
operating those cabs-identified respectively as "Blue Cab" and "Green
Cab"-and that an eyewitness testified in the ensuing trial that the cab that
hit the victim was green. Another piece of information that the participants
received concerned a rather unusual procedure that took place at this trial.
The experimenters told the participants that "[t]he court tested the witness'
ability to distinguish between Blue and Green cabs under nighttime visibil-
ity conditions [and] found that the witness was able to identify each color
correctly about 80% of the time, but confused it with the other color about
20% of the time."47 Based on this information, most participants in the ex-
periment assessed the probability that a green cab hit the victim at 0.8,
presumably because they believed that this was the probability that the eye-
witness's testimony was correct (p. 167).
This probability assessment aligned with the given credibility of the
witness, but not with Bayes' Theorem. 48 The prior odds that the errant cab
was green as opposed to blue, P(G)/P(B), equaled 0.15/0.85. To calculate
the posterior odds, P(GIW)/P(BIW), with W denoting the witness's
44. This conflation was first spotted by L. Jonathan Cohen, Can Human Irrationality
Be Experimentally Demonstrated?, 4 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 317, 328-29 (1981).
45. See, e.g., Pip Arnold et al., Enhancing Students' Inferential Reasoning: From
Hands-On to "Movies", J. STAT. EDUC., July 2011, available at http://www.amstat.org/
publications/jse/vl9n2/pfannkuch.pdf (reporting success in teaching statistical inference to
fourteen-year-old students with the help of hands-on physical simulations); Simin Hall & Eric
A. Vance, Improving Self-Efficacy in Statistics: Role of Self-Explanation & Feedback, J. STAr.
EDUC., Nov. 2010, available at www.amstat.org/publications/jse/vl8n3/hall.pdf (reporting
success in teaching introductory statistics with the help of students' self-explanation and peer
feedback).
46. Pp. 166-70; see also Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judg-
ments, 44 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 211,211-12 (1980).
47. Bar-Hillel, supra note 46, at 211-12.
48. For exposition and proof of Bayes' Theorem, see Stein, supra note 5, at 211-13.
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testimony, these odds had to be multiplied by the likelihood ratio. This ratio
equalled the odds attaching to the scenario in which the witness identified
the cab's color correctly, rather than incorrectly: P(MWG)/P(MWB). The poste-
rior odds consequently equaled (0.15 -0.8)/(0.85 • 0.2)-that is, 12/17. The
probability that the victim's allegation against Green Cab was true thus
amounted to 12/(17 + 12) or 0.41-far below the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard (> 0.5) that applies in civil litigation. The experiment thus
seems to provide an elegant and robust demonstration of individuals' total
neglect of base rates.
This and similar experimental vignettes have a serious flaw that I call
unspecified causality. The experimenters did not tell the participants that the
relative frequency of blue and green cabs' appearances on the streets of the
city could somehow affect the witness's capacity to tell blue from green.
This causal effect is quite unusual: an ordinary person can tell blue from
green even when she sees one green cab and many blue cabs.4 9 The experi-
menters therefore ought to have told the participants that the witness's
ability to distinguish between blue and green cabs might have been affected
by the frequency with which those cabs appeared on the streets. Alternative-
ly, the experimenters ought to have told the participants that in cases in
which the witness failed to give the correct identification of the cab's color,
she made this mistake randomly rather than for some specific reason.50
The experimenters, in other words, ought to have ruled the causality fac-
tor in or out. Instead, they allowed the participants to deal with the
unspecified causality as they deemed fit, and the participants rendered an
unsurprising-albeit not watertight-verdict that the distribution of cabs'
colors in the city did not affect the witness's ability to tell blue from green.
Absent a causal connection between these two factors, the errant cab's prob-
ability of being green as opposed to blue was indeed 0.8.
Unspecified causality is also a serious flaw because it makes the relevant
reference class malleable.5 To see how this malleability affected the Blue
Cab Problem, factor in the preponderance requirement that a plaintiff in a
civil suit needs to satisfy in order to win the case.52 Under this requirement,
the victim was certainly entitled to win her suit against Green Cab when the
errant cab's probability of being green, given the testimony of the witness-
P(GI W)-was greater than 0.5. The victim, however, was equally entitled to
win the suit when the probability of the scenario in which the witness cor-
rectly identified a green cab-P(141G)-was greater than 0.5. The relevant
49. See Cohen, supra note 44, at 329 ("[I1f the green cab company suddenly increased
the size of its fleet relative to that of the blue company, the accuracy of the witness's vision
would not be affected, and the credibility of his testimony would therefore remain precisely
the same in any particular case of the relevant kind.").
50. See Stein, supra note 5, at 253-55.
51. For an outstanding analysis of reference-class malleability, see Ronald J. Allen &
Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL
STUD. 107, 111-14 (2007).
52. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 143-48, 219-25 (2005) (ex-
plaining the preponderance requirement and its underlying justifications).
[Vol. 111:855
Are People Probabilistically Challenged?
reference class, in other words, could have been either the cab's color or the
witness's accuracy.53 The participants therefore could not be wrong in se-
lecting the witness's accuracy as the relevant reference class. This perfectly
rational choice allowed the participants to treat the probability of the wit-
ness's accuracy (0.8) as a dominant factor in their decision.
More fundamentally, the mix of statistical and causative information
brings into consideration the normative openness of the "probability" con-
cept.54 As a normative matter, the Blue Cab Problem can be analyzed under
two distinct analytical frameworks: mathematical (Pascalian) and causative
(Baconian)." The mathematical framework uses Bayes' Theorem, applica-
tion of which gives the victim's suit against Green Cab a 0.41 probability (if
we ignore the unspecified causality and the reference-class problem). This
probability represents the errant cab's chances of being green rather than
blue, with a cab-identifying witness scoring 80 out of 100 on similar identi-
fications in a city in which 85 percent of the cabs are blue and 15 percent are
green.
The causative framework, on the other hand, yields an altogether differ-
ent result, close to the mathematical probability of the witness's accuracy
(0.8). Under this framework, an event's probability corresponds to the quan-
tum and variety of the evidence that confirms the event's occurrence while
eliminating rival scenarios.56 This qualitative, evidential criterion separates
causative probability from the mathematical calculus of chances. 57 Under
this criterion, the witness's testimony that the errant cab was green was
credible enough to rule out the "errant blue cab" scenario as causatively im-
plausible. On the other hand, the distribution of blue and green cabs in the
city had no proven effect on the witness's capacity to tell blue from green.
The witness's testimony consequently overrode the cabs' distribution evi-
dence and removed it from the factfinding process. This eliminative method
(favored by Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill 8) allowed the participants
to evaluate the probability of the victim's case at 0.8. This factfinding meth-
od is not devoid of difficulties, but it is also far from being irrational.5 9
Contrary to Kahneman's view, the Blue Cab Problem and similar exper-
iments do not establish that people's probability judgments are irrational. 60
These judgments are predominantly rational and consequently do not call
53. This insight belongs to Owen, supra note 41, at 199.
54. See Stein, supra note 5, at 200-04.
55. Id. at 253-56.
56. Id. at 243-46.
57. Id. at 235-46.
58. Id. at 204-06, 236-40.
59. See id. at 236-40.
60. Cf. Gerd Gigerenzer, On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahne-
man and Tversky (1996), 103 PSYCHoL. REV. 592, 593 (1996) (criticizing Kahneman and
Tversky for testing people's ascriptions of probabilities to single events not amenable to such
assessments).
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for the government's paternalistic intervention.6 The legal system need not
do more than remedy people's informational shortfalls-not their cognitive
incapacities-by applying the conventional doctrines of foreseeability, dis-
closure, informed consent, unconscionability, and consumer protection.
II. BELIEF VERSUS ACCEPTANCE
Kahneman's failure to separate beliefs from acceptances looms large in
the "Linda Problem"-another celebrated experiment that he and Tversky
carried out (p. 156). Linda was described to participants as a thirty-five-
year-old woman, who was "single," "outspoken," "very bright," and deeply
concerned with "issues of discrimination and social justice." Linda's college
life included majoring in philosophy and participating in antinuclear
demonstrations. Participants were asked to select Linda's occupation and
social identity from the list provided by Kahneman and Tversky (pp. 156-
57). "Bank teller" and "feminist bank teller" were among the options on that
list. Most participants ranked Linda's being a "feminist bank teller" as more
probable than Linda's simply being a "bank teller" (p. 158).
This assessment of probability defies mathematical logic. Linda's femi-
nism was a probable, but still uncertain, fact. Her occupation as a bank teller
was a merely probable, rather than certain, fact as well. The probability of
each of those characteristics was somewhere between 0 and 1. Hence, the
probability that these two characteristics would be present simultaneously
was necessarily lower than the probability that attached to each individual
characteristic. Linda was more likely to have only the "bank teller," or only
the "feminist," characteristic than to possess both characteristics at once (p.
158). Assuming that the characteristics are mutually independent and that
the probability of each characteristic is, say, 0.6, Linda's probability of be-
ing a feminist bank teller would equal 0.36. Remarkably, this experiment's
results were replicated with doctorate students at Stanford Business School
(p. 158).
To verify this important finding, Kahneman and Tversky conducted an-
other experiment that featured a simple question: "Which alternative is more
probable? Linda is a bank teller. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
feminist movement" (p. 158). Once again, the participants ranked the sec-
ond joint-event scenario as more probable than the first single-event
scenario (p. 158).
Kahneman reports that after completing one such experiment, he asked
the participants, "Do you realize that you have violated an elementary logi-
cal rule?" In response, a graduate student said, "I thought you just asked for
my opinion" (p. 158). Kahneman cites this response to illustrate the sticki-
ness of people's probabilistic irrationality: the student who gave this
61. Note that not all behavioral economists favor paternalism. See, e.g., Korobkin, su-
pra note 2, at 1659 (calling for "refocusing the general policy discussion in law and
economics scholarship away from a pro- or antiregulatory dogmatism toward comparative
institutional analysis, in which the unregulated market must compete with administrative,
legislative, and judicial activism for claims to normative superiority in different contexts").
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response believed that her opinion on factual matters could defy mathemati-
cal logic.
The student's response, however, ought to have moved Kahneman in a
different direction. What the student was actually saying was "Had I known
that you were expecting me to give you not just my best hunch about Lin-
da's job and social identity, but rather a rule-based evaluation of the relevant
probabilities, my answer might have been different." The student, in other
words, understood the experiment as asking her to express her belief, rather
than articulate and apply her criteria for acceptances. In forming this belief,
she felt free to rely on her common sense and experience rather than on sta-
tistical rules. Her reasoning aligned with that of scientists who begin their
inquiries with intuitive beliefs that they subsequently accept or reject.62
Similarly to Kahneman's other experiments, the Linda Problem could
only elicit the beliefs that participants intuitively formed. Those beliefs do
not tell us much about the participants' probabilistic rationality. Forming a
rule-free belief, as opposed to a rule-driven acceptance, does not commit the
believer to any specific reason, or rule, that she-will follow in her other deci-
sions. 63 Acceptances driven by rules of reasoning are different. Most
medical patients, for example, would attest that having a spine surgery fol-
lowed by a coronary bypass operation is riskier than undergoing a spine
surgery alone. This attestation correctly applies the product rule for conjunc-
tive probabilities to facts that the patient deeply cares about. Unsurprisingly,
it expresses the patient's acceptance rather than belief.
As far as beliefs are concerned, the participants' prevalent reaction to the
Linda Problem was far from irrational. Formation of a person's belief al-
ways calls in the experience that a person has accumulated throughout her
life.64 This experience cannot be artificially blocked by statistical rules, un-
less the person is expressly told to suppress all of her beliefs that do not
conform to those rules and to base her decision on acceptance.65 From the
standpoint of an ordinary person's belief, the single-event scenario "Linda is
a bank teller" was incomplete because the work of bank tellers does not
normally occupy their entire lives. The absence of information about Lin-
da's social identity and afterwork engagements thus created a gap fillable by
experience. Hence, it was entirely rational for participants to make an expe-
rience-based assumption that Linda must have some social identity or
afterwork engagement. This assumption made the participants focus on the
following question: Is it more probable that "Linda is a feminist bank teller"
62. See COHEN, supra note 31, at 89-90.
63. Cf Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995) (associating
decisionmakers' reasons with their implicit commitment to apply similar reasons in future
cases).
64. See, e.g., 1 HUME, supra note 35, at 102 (famously explaining "belief" as a conse-
quence of the believer's "number of past impressions and conjunctions").
65. Cf L. Jonathan Cohen, Should a Jury Say What It Believes or What It Accepts?, 13
CARDOZO L. REv. 465 (1991) (arguing that jurors should suppress their beliefs and determine
facts through "acceptance").
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or that "Linda is a bank teller whose social identity and afterwork engage-
ments are feminism free"? 66
Based on Linda's background information, the participants were abso-
lutely (and unsurprisingly) correct in forming a belief that ranked Linda's
feminism above other afterwork engagements. In technical terms, Linda's
probability of being a bank teller and a feminist, P(T&F), equaled
P(T) . P(F). Correspondingly, Linda's probability of being a bank teller
while having a nonfeminist afterwork engagement, P(T&NF), equaled
P(T). P(NF). Under the factual setup that the participants were asked to
consider, Linda was more likely to be a feminist than a nonfeminist:
P(F) > P(NF). Hence, P(T&F) > P(T&NF).
To preclude the formation of this rational belief, Kahneman and his as-
sociates ought to have asked the participants a simple question, suggested by
Gerd Gigerenzer: "There are 100 persons who fit the description above (that
is, Linda's). How many of them are: Bank tellers? Bank tellers and active in
the feminist movement?" 67 This question would have predominantly elicited
the statistically correct response.68
Kahneman's anticipated reply to this critique might fall along the fol-
lowing lines: The participants' real task was to cut through the "noise" (the
statistically meaningless information) and see what the experimenters asked
them to do. The participants, so goes the argument, ought to have noticed
that their task was to compare the probabilities of a single event and a com-
pound, or conjunctive, event. Had the participants noticed that, they also
would have noticed that Linda's probability of being a feminist bank teller
was conceptually no different from the proverbial coin's probability to re-
veal heads in two successive throws. On a 0 to 1 scale, this probability
equals 0.5 • 0.5 = 0.25.
The coin analogy, however, is untidy because Linda's social identity and
afterwork engagement were not an unrigged coin. Linda's background in-
formation made her engagement in feminist causes the most probable
afterwork scenario. Arguably, this scenario was more probable than the sce-
nario in which Linda's work as a bank teller-surprisingly fulfilling or
unduly exhaustive-represented everything she did in her life.
The upshot of my preceding discussion is straightforward. Studies of
people's probabilistic decisions are not very fruitful when they focus on in-
tuitive beliefs. Focusing on people's rule-driven acceptances in settings that
call for statistical reasoning-as in my double-surgery example-could give
Kahneman and his collaborators a much better sense of people's probabilis-
tic rationality.
Kahneman and his collaborators have chosen not to go along this route.
Instead of adopting a simple all-statistics setup for their experiments, they
66. Cf Gerd Gigerenzer, I Think, Therefore I Err, 72 Soc. REs. 1, 8-9 (2005) (criticiz-
ing the Linda Problem and similar experiments for their reliance on a "content-blind" norm
for rationality).
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id.
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mix statistical data with case-specific information. This informational mix
can be found not only in the Linda Problem. Almost every experiment asso-
ciated with the Kahneman and Tversky school of thought uses this mix, and
there is a reason for that as well. Kahneman explains that causal associations
corrupt people's decisions: people try to find causal connections where none
exists, while irrationally discounting important statistical information (pp.
74-78). This cognitive malfunction has shaped Kahneman's and his associ-
ates' experimental agendas. Kahneman and his associates seek to uncover
how people's "causation illusion" drives them to ignore statistical data and
depart from statistical reasoning.
My examination of Kahneman's "causation illusion" theory will take
place in Part III. In the remainder of this Part, I revisit a methodological
concern that has appeared in prior literature but failed to draw Kahneman's
attention.69 Kahneman and his collaborators' experimental method impli-
cates "entrapment by noise." The experimenters pit statistical data against
case-specific information, perceived as uninformative "noise." The "noise"
is introduced to divert the unwary participants from the solid statistical data.
In the Blue Cab Problem, the postulated veracity of a case-specific testimo-
ny coming from an eyewitness served as a trap. The Linda Problem featured
a similar trap: the young woman's attraction to feminism. The experimenters
then asked the participants to deal with a case-specific question ("How like-
ly is it that the victim was hit by a green cab?" and "Is Linda more likely to
be a bank teller than a feminist bank teller?").
These traps show nothing besides the conjurer's sleight of hand: each
trap can only work once against the same person. 70 After falling into one of
these traps, the unsuspecting person only needs to be told that, under the
given rules, she was not supposed to have allowed "soft" case-specific in-
formation to override "hard" statistical data. After adopting this normative
premise as her rule for future decisions, the person will no longer make the
same mistake.7' If she knows the applicable statistical rules, she will apply
them correctly. If she is unfamiliar with those rules, she will try to find out
what they are and, if necessary, seek expert advice.72 Under neither scenario
can such a person be considered cognitively incompetent and in need of the
government's intervention.
69. See Cohen, supra note 44, at 328-29.
70. See Alex Stein, A Liberal Challenge to Behavioral Economics: The Case of Proba-
bility, 2 N.YU. J.L. & LIBERTY 531, 537-38 (2007) (making the "sleight of hand" point).
71. See ARTHUR S. REBER, IMPLICIT LEARNING AND TACIT KNOWLEDGE 35-45 (1993)
(reporting experimental studies that showed success in people's internalization of probabilistic
rules).
72. Kahneman also questions experts' ability to avoid fallacies in probabilistic reason-
ing. See Chapters 21-22. His evidence, however, is not robust enough to support this
skepticism.
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III. CAUSATION VERSUS CHANCE
Kahneman criticizes people for putting too much faith in causation (pp.
74-78, 114-18, Chapter Sixteen), yet he himself canonizes chance.
Kahneman assumes that incomplete causal indicators can only create an
associative illusion of causation (pp. 74-78). At the same time, he professes
that incomplete statistical indicators-the chances that surround us-are
real and hence dependable (Chapters Six, Sixteen).
This unexplained normative asymmetry is best illustrated by another
milestone experiment of Kahneman and Tversky. Aimed at identifying the
"representativeness" bias, the "Steve Problem" featured Steve, described to
participants as "very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with little
interest in people, or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a
need for order and structure, and a passion for detail" (p. 420). The experi-
menters asked the participants to choose Steve's most probable occupation
from a list that included "farmer, salesman, airline pilot, librarian, [and]
physician" (p. 420). According to Kahneman and Tversky, the participants
used familiar (i.e., "representative") stereotypes to identify Steve as a likely
librarian, while ignoring the fact that librarians are vastly outnumbered by
farmers (p. 420).
Kahneman assumes that there was only one correct way to answer the
question about Steve's job (pp. 420-21). According to Kahneman, the par-
ticipants had to find out the percentage of farmers, salesmen, airline pilots,
librarians, and physicians in the general pool of working males. This per-
centage determined Steve's probability of being a farmer, a salesman, an
airline pilot, a librarian, or a physician. Kahneman believes that trying to
identify Steve's profession through his personality traits was doomed to fail,
as these traits were rather weak causal indicators of a person's professional
identity. The general statistic representing an average working male's
chances of having one of the above-mentioned professions was a far more
dependable indicator. This indicator therefore ought to have trumped the
uninformative individual traits. The participants' failure to notice this statis-
tical indicator, and their consequent reliance on Steve's individual traits, was
a cognitive error (pp. 420-21).
I posit that this experiment was poorly designed. Steve's personality
traits did not make him a librarian, but they were certainly relevant to his
choice of profession. If so, the participants should have been looking for a
different, and more refined, statistic. Specifically, they should have been
looking for the percentage of farmers, salesmen, airline pilots, librarians,
and physicians in the general pool of working males who are shy, withdrawn
and helpful, have meek and tidy souls and a passion for detail, and also need
order and structure, while exhibiting little interest in people and the world of
reality. Of course, this investigation would have been futile because general
employment statistics do not single out the subcategory of working males
formulated by Kahneman and Tversky. However, the fact that this investiga-
tion would have been futile does not make it inconsequential. Information
revealing Steve's job preferences was material. Distribution of professions
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across working males generally was a rough and potentially misleading sub-
stitute for that information. This distribution was informative, but its
evidential value did not outweigh the evidential value of Steve's personality
traits. Kahneman apparently thinks that it did, but this is just an opinion ra-
ther than empirical fact. People participating in the experiment were entitled
to use their opinions instead.
The Steve Problem's design incorporated unspecified causality. This fea-
ture opened two decisional routes for the experiment's participants. One
could rationally estimate Steve's probability of being a librarian as a matter
of chance. Alternatively, one could estimate this probability as a question of
Steve's choice. Under the framework of chance, decisionmakers would rely
on the distribution of relevant professions across working males in general.
Under the framework of choice, they would consider a probable bargaining
equilibrium between Steve and prospective employers. This equilibrium
solution would practically remove from the list the physician, the pilot, and
the salesman. Arguably, as between being a farmer and being a librarian,
Steve would choose to be a librarian. Finding a librarian position might be
difficult-given the scarcity of such positions, relative to the many jobs
available on a farm-but Steve could succeed in getting it.
Kahneman disapproves of the participants' preference for the choice
framework. Notwithstanding his disapproval, this preference is perfectly
rational. The choice framework is not problem free, given the scarcity of
case-specific information about Steve, but extrapolating Steve's probable
occupation from the general pool of working males is equally problematic.
Both modes of reasoning rely heavily on speculation, and there is conse-
quently no way to tell which of them is epistemically preferable. Calling
one of these modes of reasoning "rational" and another "irrational" is simp-
ly wrong.
Unspecified causality in an experiment's design always makes the rele-
vant reference class malleable. Consider again Steve's case. Individuals
participating in this experiment could have perceived their task in two com-
pletely different ways. They could have asked themselves whether Steve's
personality traits separate him from the average working male. According to
Kahneman, this was the right question to ask. However, an altemative-and
equally rational-way to define the reference class was to focus on a nar-
rower category of working males who have Steve's characteristics. The
relevant reference class, in other words, could be either of the following: (1)
males, as distributed across different professions; or (2) professions, as dis-
tributed across different males. The first of these categories emphasizes
chance, while the second centers on choice. There is no way to determine
which of those categories is more dependable than the other as a basis for
statistical inference. Kahneman evidently prefers chance over choice. The
participants in his and Tversky's experiments chose the opposite. As for my-
self, I remain undecided.
Kalneman's preference for chance over choice gets extreme in his dis-
cussion of capitalism and entrepreneurship (pp. 256-63). This section of
Kahneman's book identifies the widespread presence of entrepreneurial
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luck. According to Kahneman, a risky business venture that beats the
odds-for example, opening a successful restaurant in an economic envi-
ronment in which most new restaurants fail and close soon after opening
(pp. 256-57)-must not be easily credited to the entrepreneur's shrewdness.
More often than not, good fortune is the real cause of the venture's success.
From an ex ante perspective, the entrepreneur's venture originated from a
serious probabilistic error: a decision to invest in a venture that disregarded
the venture's low probability of success. The venture consequently was des-
tined to fail. Ex post, however, the entrepreneur came upon luck and
succeeded against the odds. Her profit from the venture is consequently a
windfall or, at best, the fortuitous outcome of a wild gamble.
This characterization of entrepreneurial profits has an important norma-
tive implication that rejects the classic economic view.73 From both a moral
and economic point of view, a society that sets up welfare and social safety
nets to protect citizens against the consequences of misfortune and disaster
has a strong case for obligating a person who comes upon luck to share her
windfall with others. According to this view, society can justifiably capture a
substantial fraction of entrepreneurial windfalls by imposing high taxes on
unearned profits. 74
Unfortunately, Kahneman's account of entrepreneurship is flawed in
several respects. For one thing, successful entrepreneurs often try to pro-
mote a number of independent ventures simultaneously. Consider an
entrepreneur who promotes three mutually independent ventures, and as-
sume that each venture has a 0.3 probability of success. Because the
entrepreneur has diversified her business, her probability of succeeding in
one of those ventures equals 0.66 .7 This probability increases the entrepre-
neur's expected profit to a level that might well justify her investment in the
ventures. More importantly, the entrepreneur may have case-specific
knowledge not available to her competitors on the market. This knowledge
makes Kahneman's statistical averages altogether irrelevant.76
Kahneman criticizes people's reliance on case-specific knowledge as a
"law of small numbers" (Chapter Ten). This criticism is far removed from
73. Cf FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 284-85 (1921) (famously
arguing that entrepreneurs move an economy forward by taking risks and hence should be
allowed to capture the gains of their ventures).
74. See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1494-96 (1999) (justifying socie-
ty's capture of private windfalls on efficiency grounds because a "taxation of rents does not
alter agents' economic decisions").
75. The simplest way to calculate this probability is to subtract the compound probabil-
ity of the ventures' failure (0.7' = 0.34) from 1. This calculation derives from the classic
portfolio theory. See HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION 37-71 (1959).
76. Cf Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1722-
31, 1755-56 (2004) (preferring a decentralized regime that allows owners to increase wealth
through heterogeneous utilizations of property to a system that overrides owners' holdouts by
authorizing efficient takings of their property in exchange for a court-determined average
price).
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how most people-including judges and juries77-ascertain facts in their
day-to-day lives. Kahneman's skepticism about case-specific knowledge
also cannot be justified as a wholesale proposition, for it brushes aside a
distinct mode of probabilistic reasoning, known as causative or Baconian
probability.78 Kahneman's disregard of Baconian probability is perplexing.
This mode of probabilistic reasoning is perfectly rational, 79 and it also could
explain-and, indeed, justify-people's decisions that Kahneman and his
collaborators describe as erroneous.
80
Under the Baconian system, a combination of credible case-specific evi-
dence and experience can develop a single causal explanation for the
relevant event that will override the competing statistical explanations.8'
This override is the essence of the Baconian elimination method.82 For ex-
ample, in the Blue Cab Problem, participants were entitled to assign
overriding force to the witness's testimony that the errant cab was green.
This testimony was not watertight, but it was credible and event specific.
The event's causal impact on the witness's perceptive apparatus qualitatively
differed from the city's cab-color statistics. This impact might have been
epistemically superior to those statistics and therefore properly overrode
them in the participants' minds.
This override was likely at work in the Steve Problem as well. There,
participants used Steve's personality traits to eliminate from their list every
profession that did not fit the stereotype associated with these traits. "Librar-
ian" was the only item that survived this elimination procedure, which led
the participants to estimate that Steve must be a librarian. Kahneman cor-
rectly observes that this estimate was unfounded (p. 420).83 He is, however,
too quick to denounce the participants' reasoning for failing to account for a
random male's probability of being a farmer, as opposed to a librarian. Un-
der the Baconian system of probability, the elimination method that the
participants chose to use was valid. The participants may have misapplied
this method, as they did not have enough evidence for choosing the librarian
over the farmer, but they were perfectly rational in deciding to use it.
77. See STEIN, supra note 52, at 80-106 (explaining case-specificity requirements in
the law of evidence).
78. See Stein, supra note 5, at 204-06, 235-46.
79. See id.
80. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE DIALOGUE OF REASON: AN ANALYSIS OF ANALYTI-
CAL PHILOSOPHY 165-68 (1986) (explaining why it is rational for people to rely on causative
probabilities instead of naked statistics).
81. Stein, supra note 5, at 235-46.
82. Id. at 204-06.
83. P. 420 ("In the case of Steve ... the fact that there are many more farmers than
librarians in the population should enter into any reasonable estimate of the probability that
Steve is a librarian rather than a farmer.").
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CONCLUSION
The accomplishments of the Behavioral Economics movement, led by
Kahneman and Tversky, are numerous and impressive. The most significant
of those accomplishments is the reorientation of economics from a predom-
inantly theoretical modeling of rational choice to empirical and
experimental studies that focus on people's real-life decisions. Scholars and
policymakers interested in understanding this reorientation must read Think-
ing, Fast and Slow. This book is the best in the field and will retain this
status for years to come. A more specific, yet equally remarkable, achieve-
ment of the movement, for which full credit goes to Kahneman and Tversky,
is the "prospect theory" that powerfully explains people's valuations of un-
certain gains and losses (Chapters Twenty-Five to Twenty-Seven).
Unfortunately, I cannot say the same about Kahneman and his collabora-
tors' contribution to the understanding of people's assessments of
probability. As I demonstrated in this Review, Kahneman and his collabora-
tors attempt to advance this understanding by using an incomplete and
unstable set of criteria for rational determinations of probability. This set is
incomplete in that it does not separate intuitive "beliefs" from rule-based
"acceptances" and gives no recognition to Baconian probability. This set is
unstable because it tolerates unspecified causality and malleable reference
classes. Evaluating the rationality of people's probabilistic decisions by ap-
plying this set of criteria is consequently wrong. A person who fails to align
her intuitive beliefs with the rules of probability may well be rational in her
rule-based decisions. A person who relies on Baconian probability in mak-
ing case-specific decisions is not irrational either. And a person who ascribes
probability to a causally unspecified event featuring a malleable reference
class can simply never go wrong: her guesswork will be as good as anyone
else's.
The incompleteness and instability of Kahneman's normative framework
have an additional troubling implication for behavioral economics. This
framework allows behavioral economists to portray as irrational any deci-
sion that a person might make in a given situation. Consider the following
hypothetical scenario: To increase faculty members' productivity, Jane's
university offers her a substantial raise in exchange for giving up her tenure
as an economics professor. Jane is a prolific scholar, a gifted teacher, and a
valuable institutional player who is much admired by her colleagues. Her
probability of being fired is therefore extremely low. Jane nevertheless turns
the university's offer down. As any behavioral economist would attest, this
decision suffers from the "endowment effect"-an overvaluation of Jane's
tenure that kills an economically beneficial transaction. Assume now that
Jane changes her mind and accepts the university's offer. This decision
could also be deemed irrational because it fails to reflect the fact that Jane
cannot accurately predict her untold future as an academic. Many behavioral
economists would be ready to attest that Jane's acceptance of the universi-
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ty's offer exhibits overoptimism-the "planning fallacy" in Kahneman's
terms.84
Is there a way out of this maze? 5 As this Review is getting too long, I
leave this question for readers to decide. For my part, I can only recommend
that Jane decline Kahneman's invitation to think of herself as probabilisti-
cally challenged. Instead of entertaining this invitation, Jane should take full
responsibility for her decision and make her best effort at ascertaining the
relevant probabilities. She will do well.
Our policymakers, in turn, would also do well to put on hold the pro-
posals urging the government to step in and fix people's probabilistic
decisions. 86 This paternalism, both "soft" and invasive, is unlikely to im-
prove people's decisions. At the same time, it may unduly suppress the
creativity and heterogeneity of individuals' choices.87
84. See pp. 249-51.
85. This maze is a mirror image of the oft-made complaint that economists can vindi-
cate any behavior as rational. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS
xvi (1991) ("No matter how strange a particular economic action might seem to be, some
economist can usually construct a rational explanation for it.").
86. See Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 1349,
1362-66 (2011) (commending cautious regulatory policy that integrates free-market princi-
ples).
87. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and
Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207 (2006) (arguing that government's paternalistic interven-
tion restricting individual choice ought to be limited because deviations from rationality norms
vary across individuals and groups).
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